Suchergebnisse

My article replies to Allen Carlson's critique of the existing literature on Chinese nationalism (Carlson's article was published in Volume 15, issue 1 of Nations and Nationalism, 2009). I address Carlson's criticisms and proceed to evaluate his proposal to move away from an allegedly unhelpful focus on nationalism towards the allegedly more illuminating framework of national identity construction. My approach to the existing literature on Chinese nationalism acknowledges efforts made within it at grappling with issues of theory and definition and builds on this acknowledgement to operate a selective appraisal of its strengths and weaknesses. I argue that while some of the problems identified by Carlson do indeed plague the literature, his advocacy of abandoning nationalism as a focus of research is unwarranted. There is continuing validity in using nationalism as a lens for understanding how China sees its place in the world. Adapted from the source document.

AbstractMy article replies to Allen Carlson's critique of the existing literature on Chinese nationalism (Carlson's article was published in Volume 15, issue 1 of Nations and Nationalism, 2009). I address Carlson's criticisms and proceed to evaluate his proposal to move away from an allegedly unhelpful focus on nationalism towards the allegedly more illuminating framework of national identity construction. My approach to the existing literature on Chinese nationalism acknowledges efforts made within it at grappling with issues of theory and definition and builds on this acknowledgement to operate a selective appraisal of its strengths and weaknesses. I argue that while some of the problems identified by Carlson do indeed plague the literature, his advocacy of abandoning nationalism as a focus of research is unwarranted. There is continuing validity in using nationalism as a lens for understanding how China sees its place in the world.

This article fills a gap in the literature of international involvement in the aftermath of the Indonesian invasion of Timor-Leste by providing detailed documentary analysis of British conduct and motives. A substantial amount of scholarship has covered the role played by the United States and Australia during and after the Indonesian invasion of 1975. The lack of scholarly work specific to the role played by Britain during the first years of the Indonesian-Timorese conflict is regrettable as it represents a missing piece in the mosaic of international liability for one of the major massacres committed in the twentieth century. This omission has allowed the official British government version to survive, in which the country plays the role of an honest but ultimately unsuccessful broker working for a diplomatic solution between Indonesia and Portugal that would ensure the right to self-determination for Timor. The existing literature only offers a cursory challenge to this idea of British neutrality. The current article examines the details of British complicity by focusing on three main areas: the handling of the Dunn Report, which was effectively translated into a campaign to rescue Indonesia's reputation both Timor Archives, building the archival records of Falintil, the Timorese Resistance Army domestically and internationally; the policy of aid to Jakarta, where economic and geo-strategic interests trumped considerations of ethics and international legality; and finally British abstention at the UN, advertised as the epitome of neutrality but actually representing a choice of support for Suharto's regime. (Pac Aff/GIGA)